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Abstract 
In this paper we present a new reasonable method for writing security cases. A security case is one form of assurance case 
as there are other forms such as safety case, reliability case, dependability case and so on. Assurance case is a technique to 
structure assurance requirements concerning a system. It contains argumentation structure and evidence to convince a 
stakeholder that a certain concern on whether it is safety, reliability or security is being assured by the implementation of 
proper and appropriate actions that counters the risks or vulnerabilities raised by the concerned stakeholder. A security case 
is somehow very unpopular if we compare it to a safety case. And therefore, it is safe to say that so far; safety cases are 
better versed than security cases. However, due to the ever-growing concerns of the area of Cyber-Security, it is extremely 
crucial to produce effective and accurate security cases for cyber-systems. 
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1. Introduction  
Security does not appear on the list of dependability attributes. Instead, the terms that are related to security 
are best defined in terms of integrity, confidentiality, and availability. The reason why security does not 
appear as an individual term is because it is very difficult to define what a secure system will mean because 
concerns in the security area are too diverse to deal with. For example, some systems are more concerned with 
unauthorized access to information while some are more concerned with denial-of-service attacks and so on. 
Nevertheless, our daily life reliance on information and software systems is ever increasing for the purpose of 
convenience, efficiency, and security. We all know that modern systems runs for long periods of time and are 
being constantly improved in service objectives and stakeholders’ requirements under evolving technologies 
and changing regulations or standards. At the same time, these systems have become extremely complex and 
hence the high demand for dependable systems. And in order to achieve dependable systems, assurance cases 
are becoming indispensable. 
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Conventional technologies such as software processes and/or formal methods alone cannot guarantee the 
dependability of present-day complex systems anymore. Such complex systems are required to have proper 
written assurance cases in order for the system stakeholders to admit to its (complex system) dependability. 
There are many well-written documents on how to write safety cases and reliability cases but very few on 
security cases. The reason for this is not the concern of this paper but to propose a sensible method of how to 
write a security case by looking at previous and current systems with (1) similar functionalities (not 
necessarily an exact match), (2) running under similar environment/s and more important; (3) suspected of 
encountering similar risks. This paper is limited to networking and information systems such as our global 
networking e-learning system named KISSEL or Knowledge Integrated Server System for E-Learning. 
2. Introducing our new method 
From the current method, the decision of what aspect of the system (whether its safety, reliability or 
availability) to be assured via assurance case is usually directly or indirectly comes from its (the system under 
review) risk assessment results and report, system expert’s previous experience (lessons leant) and so forth. 
However in our new method, since we are getiing all these risk assessment results and reports plus the lessons 
leant of from similar systems, we can actually use these gathered informations into our advantage. For example, 
in Table 1 below, we show a list of the most popular security vulnerabilities that most information sharing and 
infromation storage system have to overcome. And of this list of security vulnerabilities also known to us as 
claims, we built and derived from it a list of solutions evidence for the construction of a security case. 
Table 1. List of the most common security vulnerabilities with possible solution to help by limiting the risk causal factors 
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To put things into perspective, it is more sensible if we show the strategy node of our security case diagram 
shown in Figure 1. From Table 1, we derived from it 7 sub-goals for our security case labelled Goal: G_2, 




Fig.1. Our 7 sub-goals derived from the list of vulnerabilities shown in Table 1.  
This decomposition supports the strategy node Strategy: S_1 with an argument for security vulnerability.  
2.1 Essential documentations that is required to be inserted into the security case diagram  
During the development of the security assurance case, it is very important to understand what sort of 
documents one should use to show as evidence inside the security case and what documents is necessary to be 
inserted into the security case diagram. The following list is called Security Requirement Documentations List. 
In our new method, we used this list as a checklist of documentations that are required to be inserted into the 
“context” node and so as the solution node if found suited.  
Table 2: Security Requirement Documentations List 
 
Security Awareness:
Have you ensured that the corporate security policies and guidelines to which you are
designing are the latest versions? Have you read them? Are you aware of all relevant
computing security compliance and risk acceptance processes? (Interviewer should list
all relevant policies and guidelines.)
Identification
Authentication:
Diagram the process flow of how a user is identified to the application and how the
application authenticates that the user is who they claim to be. Provide supporting
documentation to the diagram explaining the flow from the user interface to the
application/database server(s) and back to the user. Are you compliant with corporate
policies on accounts, passwords, etc.?
Authorization:
Provide a process flow from beginning to end showing how a user requests access to the
application, indicating the associated security controls and separation of duties. This
should include how the request is approved by the appropriate data owner, how the user
is placed into the appropriate access-level classification profile, how the user ID,
password, and access is created and provided to the user. Also include how the user is
informed of their responsibilities associated with using the application, given a copy of
the access agreement, how to change password, who to call for help, etc.
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3. Building the Security D-Case 
In this section of the paper, we briefly explain the steps of how we build our security case structured diagram 
using the D-Case technique. Our security case diagram is derived from the information provided by the list 
(refer to Table 1) of the most common security vulnerabilities that are often encountered by corporate 
information sharing systems or networking systems. But before the building of the security dependability case, 
first we’d like to explain about what a dependability case is. 
3.1. Building the Security Case 
This new method was used and tested as an experimental research application to provide assurance to the 
security aspect of our networking E-learning system called KISSEL (Knowledge Integrated Server System for 
E-Learning). More work, experiment and tests (trail and error) are still needed in order to take our work into 
the next stage. But as all great ideas and great technologies of today, it all started from a simple vision. 
The security domain is not new to networking and information sharing systems. Therefore, such systems 
have been associated with security factors for as long as networking and information systems existed. What is 
really new here is the urge to associate the networking system with assurance case that assured the networking 
system will behave as predicted, function well under pressure from future security vulnerabilities and attacks 
and so on. 
Since we are building a security case, therefore our top goal or the main claim that we are going to argue 
about our system should be the “System is reasonably secure”. To support this top goal or claim, the context 
nodes should provide whichever sort of environmental information about the system or any sort of attachment 
that helps to make the main argument truthful or convincing; like for example, documents like the system 
requirements which tells of what kind of security requirements that the system has in order to secure the 
system from unwanted attacks, or any kinds of security design architecture diagram if any, and so forth. 
Figure 2 is to provide a visualized view of what this paragraph is trying explain. Figure 2 shows only the top 
most part of our security case diagram. 
 
Fig.2. The main Goal of our security case diagram Goal: G_1 with 2 Context nodes C_1 and C_2 
 
After the top goal is set with all the necessary contexts. What follows is the decomposition step or stage of 
Access Controls:
Document how the user IDs, passwords, and access profiles are added, changed,




Provide documentation that identifies sensitive data requiring additional protection.
Identify the data owners responsible for this data and the process to be used to protect
storage, transmission, printing, and distribution of this data. Include how the password
file/field is protected. How will users be prevented from viewing someone else’s
sensitive information? Are there agreements with outside parties (partners, suppliers,
contractors, etc.) concerning the safeguarding of information? If so, what are the
obligations?
Audit Trails and Audit
Logs:
Identify and document group accounts required by the users or application support,
including operating system group accounts. Identify and document individual accounts
and/or roles that have super-user type privileges, what these privileges are, who has
access to these accounts, how access to these accounts is controlled, tracked, and logged,
and how password change and distribution are handled, including operating system
accounts. Also identify audit logs. Who should read the audit logs; who should modify
the audit logs; who can delete the audit logs, and how the audit logs are protected and
stored. Is the user ID obscured in the audit trails?
External Access
Considerations:
Will the application be used internally only? If not, are you compliant with corporate
external access requirements?
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the main argument or the ‘main goal’ into two or more sub-goals. However, prior to the decomposition stage, 
where the ‘sub-goal nodes’ comes into the picture, the node called ‘strategy’ is inserted between the main goal 
and the sub-goals. The strategy node should explain or give a sense of justification or reason to why we the 
security case builders decided to decompose the main goal into such and such number of sub-goals. In figure 
6, the strategy links us to some of the identified security vulnerabilities displayed in table 1.  In this example, 
we take 6 identified security vulnerabilities as sub-goals. And the strategy is to argue over each of the 6 





Fig.3. Our 7 sub-goals derived from the list of vulnerabilities shown in Table 1 
No matter what the assurance case or the D-Case is, whether it is a safety case, reliability case or a security 
case, they all follow a kind of pattern. For example, [9] security case patterns are claims-argument-evidence 
structures that can be reused in many different security cases. The security case method offers the opportunity 
for security and domain experts to organize security knowledge and mitigation strategies in the form of security 
case patterns. Such patterns can then be shared among the security community and other stakeholder 
communities and continually built upon, refined, and improved. A growing repository of security case patterns 
is a huge possibility for a variety of domains and operational contexts that not only would provide greater 
opportunities for reuse and standardization of assurance arguments, but also could allow the security 
community to associate an historical record of security performance and return on investment with particular 
security case patterns.  
In the last measure to our security case, we would see that some of the sub-goals got themselves a straight 
forward evident or solution that satisfy the final objective in supporting of the main goal, while in some sub-
goals, they have to be expanded more widely in order to get to the heart of where the evident truly exist.  Figure 
7 shows how sub-goals one, two and three are decomposed until the evident that satisfy all the objectives of the 









Fig.4. Here is how we decomposed Goal: G_1 ~ Goal: G_3 and at the bottom is the solution nodes that we derived from our discussions 
which was then inserted in Table 1. 
Our next figure; Figure 5 shows how we decomposed sub-goal Goal: G_4 into four more sub-goals of sub-
goal G_4.1, sub-goal G_4.2, sub-goal G_4.3 and sub-goal G_4.4. Note that for sub-goal G_4.1, we added one 
property of D-Case called node = undeveloped which means this sub-goal G_4.1 is yet to be completed. Many 
1 3 
2 
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factors could contribute to be the reason why a sub-goal is labelled undeveloped. For example, one of the 
factors could be that the evident or evidence provided to satisfy the objective of sub-goal G_4.1 is not well 








Fig.5. This figure shows how sub-goal 4 is decomposed into 4 more sub-goals of 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 
 
4. Evaluation and Conclusion 
We proposed a new and sensible method of how we should write security cases. This security case though 
may only be suited for information networking systems with small budgets. The current method is still working 
however it is too costly and therefore not suited for projects with small budgets. By assessing similar systems 
(similar in functionalities, running under similar environment and gathered previous encountered risks reports), 
we the security case developers could easily managed and discuss all the necessary actions prior to the 
development of the security case. This step helped to limit the cost of having experts to do all the preliminary 
jobs for you. We have a complete manual of security cases developed for our e-learning system. And so far, it 
has helped us to limit the threats we already faced and threats that are yet to be faced.  
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